Regional coalitions have challenged the American world order
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, US unilateralism has intensified in various areas of the world, and Washington has gradually deepened its intervention in all areas. This policy culminated during the presidency of Donald Trump in the United States, in a way that made the countries of the world tired and disgusted with the monopolies of the White House. About a decade ago, a number of countries that anticipated this situation began to form smaller alliances. Now, in almost every geographical area, a group of countries have formed smaller and smaller political and economic alliances in order to achieve their goals as much as possible through greater regional coordination.
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Western think tank, in a comprehensive report, analyzes the new era of alliances in the international arena and states that the structure of alliances in key and strategic regions of the world is changing. Accordingly, one of the notable features in many areas is the smaller size of alliances, which in this paper is called “minilateralism”. In this context, smaller international groups come together to meet limited but important strategic goals; This action stands against larger, older, or more formal coalitions or bilateral or multilateral institutions.
The growing stubbornness and resistance of “challenging governments” in the international arena, such as China, Iran, Russia and Turkey, has been the main driver of countries moving towards micro-alliances.According to the analysis, the main driver of this trend has been the growing stubbornness and resistance of “challenging governments” in the international arena, such as China, Iran, Russia and Turkey. Previously, the strategic behavior of these countries was not taken seriously enough by coalitions or security structures, and now the global situation has created the impression that the strategic agility of such countries has increased.
Biden and the Beijing-Moscow Alliance Challenge
This American think tank has tried to give an overview of the current situation alongside the current situation and the order and structure of the US-led unions. China and Russia ‘s views on past and future strategic partnerships and alliances are also examined. The institute researchers then assessed the central trend lines of the alliances at two global levels and then focusing on the three strategic and vital regions of Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Europe. At the end of the text, the possible consequences of creating a different structure of alliances on the security policies of Western countries are analyzed.
According to this analysis, it seems that with the presidency of Joe Biden, the United States has consciously begun to redraw the global structure and strengthen the security framework left over from World War II. These structures, which helped Washington win the Cold War, seem to have to prepare now for a new confrontation in the form of competition or conflict with another emerging superpower.
In recent times, China has largely weakened formal alliances, and President Xi Jinping has implicitly warned Washington against forming small alliances. Beijing has launched a number of strategic partnerships or is working closely with target countries. Beijing is now pursuing the establishment of the Community of Common Destiny as an alternative to US-led world order, thereby seeking to protect China’s interests. At the same time, Russia cannot offer a plausible alternative to the US-led order, but it has the potential to play a disruptive role in the American order and to undermine Western ambitions.
In addition, the emerging partnership between Beijing and Moscow could become an important link with significant strategic implications. Beijing is now seeking an alternative to US-led world order, while Moscow is seeking to disrupt American order and impede Western ambitions.
Mini-multilateralism of independent countries
Some Asia-Pacific and even European countries sometimes speak of Washington’s strategic concerns with Beijing. By doing so, they either want to prove themselves useful to the United States or form an alliance with the United States in the form of like-minded partners – to safeguard their interests and strike a balance between Washington and Beijing. Others seek strategic independence but are aware of their limited resources and are not optimistic about their rival regional governments. These countries form small groups to pursue their own interests, but the United States has no place in these groups. So far this has been particularly significant in the Middle East, but it may be even greater in Europe and elsewhere.
While managing large institutions becomes very difficult and achieving strategic independence becomes very difficult, for some countries, mini-multilateralism is a new and fundamental option. Although this process contains some overt and covert diplomatic challenges, in the current international environment it can help countries achieve some strategic goals. While formal alliances remain and in many respects irreplaceable and vital, the rapidly emerging geoeconomic and security partnerships are likely to create a special strategic space in the future.
NATO will continue to be the main ally on the Green Continent and an essential organization in the security of European countries, but NATO and the European Union will not be able to meet all their needs in the existing world order.NATO and the European Union can no longer meet all their needs in the existing world order.
In Europe, the current trend of security mini-multilateralism poses challenges and opportunities for France, Germany and the United Kingdom. If these three leading European capitals were able to unite in small groups, with each other or with other European partners eager to fill existing security gaps, they could more easily pursue their European (and national) interests in the face of larger global trends. With the growing legitimacy of multilateralism as a strategic option, European governments, including the new German government, may develop more subtle multilateral approaches to advance their own interests.
Properly managed mini-multilateralism can increase the security of European countries, but such an issue is not able to overcome the persistent feeling of lack of strategic thinking in Berlin, London and Paris.
Three micro-alliances in the Middle East
In the decades after World War II, Middle Eastern nations formed small and weak alliances, and regional powers relied on the security support of their allies, the report said. They never behaved like Western Europe, the ambitions of powerful countries, along with the fears of young and weak countries, hindered regional cooperation in the Middle East. Israel also humiliated and defeated the Arab League in several periods. The Syria-Iran agreement in the 1980s was the first and most effective example of strategic cooperation between the countries of the Middle East.
According to the think tank, “Even more realistic efforts, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have failed to produce satisfactory security results. The agreement between Syria and Iran in the 1980s can be considered the first and most effective example of strategic cooperation in the Middle East. Although this alliance was created to counter Saddam, it brought strategic depth and good benefits to Tehran and Damascus. However, it did not lead to a complete union. In general, no Middle Eastern country is strong enough to significantly influence its neighbors; The impact on the whole region is beyond the power of one country.
Washington’s intense intervention in the Middle East for decades hid the lack of effective security order in the region. After defending Saudi Arabia and liberating Kuwait under the leadership of a multinational coalition in 1990-1991, the United States pursued a policy of dual containment between Iraq and Iran, along with failed diplomacy to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Since 2011, this environment has experienced considerable pressure, and US regional partners no longer see the United States as fully defending their broad interests. The failure to shape Iraq’s future has shaken America’s pillar of power in the Middle East and, in turn, allowed Iran to shift its regional balance in its favor. “These developments have increased the Gulf states’ distrust of the United States.”
The dynamism of the Middle East over the past decade has led to alignments and partnerships that seemed unlikely until a few years ago. The escalation of regional tensions, the marked reduction of the US presence and the lack of adequate security frameworks have prompted special partnerships to be put on the agenda of Arab rulers, even with rival governments such as Iran and Turkey. In the absence of a dominant foreign power or a credible local multilateral organization, small groupings have become a useful way for regional governments to pursue interests. Through these groupings, governments seek to increase their influence, depth, and ability to spread power and compete.
Analysts at the institute claimed that they emerged through the turmoil of powerful three-axis regions with differing views on world affairs that advance the geopolitics of the Middle East. An Iranian-led front included the government and paramilitary allies in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. An authoritarian conservative axis led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, supported by other Gulf states, especially Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco. The third group is an Islamist-populist group led by Turkey and Qatar that has supported Islamist parties throughout the region, some of which have briefly risen to power in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.
In addition, the members of the above axes have sought to attract practical pragmatic participation: Iran cooperated strategically with Russia in Syria, the UAE established special relations with Russia and India, and established normal relations with Israel; Egypt also established strong ties with Mediterranean countries, including France.
The future of the Middle East alliances
The concluding section of this strategic paper on the Middle East states that “mini-multilateralism” has the advantage of allowing like-minded countries to work together on specific issues without the need for full alignment. However, the two examples of mini-multilateralism in the Middle East described here show that demarcations resulting from regional disorder and intense competition do not lead to a stable and inclusive security order. There are signs that a new small multilateral group of Egypt, Iraq and Jordan is emerging in the Middle East; This partnership is still in its infancy.
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, as the core of the alliance, formed small groups that seemed strong in the early years, but gradually weakened and succumbed to internal tensions, external changes, and most importantly, unrealistic expectations. Their bilateral partnership may last and form another small multilateral group in the future. In contrast, multilateralism in the Eastern Mediterranean as a threat-based group seems more stable and realistic, but at the same time it may undermine NATO’s political cohesion by creating excessive expectations.
According to the American think tank, mini-multilateralism is likely to be a dynamic feature of the Middle East in the years to come. Although the strategic efficiency of this process has been low so far, it has provided an attractive form of participation for countries to operate in an environment of distrust, lack of binding laws or institutions, and lack of decisive foreign intervention. In fact, there are signs that a new small multilateral group of Egypt, Iraq and Jordan is emerging. This partnership is still in its infancy but is emerging as a pragmatic competitor to the previous axes; Because the former warring Middle East alliances focus on regional energy and resources. However, the long-term vision of the new group is weak because, like other small groups in the region, it will face the challenges of changing regional conditions, political divergence among members, and unrealistic expectations.
Although the regional partnerships of the past decade have had political and military implications, they have not necessarily been accompanied by strategic success. There may not be a definite winner for this tumultuous stage yet, but obviously the strategic geometry of the region is changing.
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